The authors examine how the Russian judiciary devises legal policies when adjudicating cases in which religious beliefs are concerned. First, the authors describe the theoretical framework within which research on this matter can be conducted. This framework can be constructed on the basis of the theory of legal argumentation. Applying this framework to the investigation of the Russian court practice enables the authors to discover important features which are characteristic of legal reasoning in this category of cases. The Constitutional Court of Russia has chosen to abstain from crafting principles of legal policy regarding religious issues; yet, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, by and large, is not followed by the Russian judiciary, and the Supreme Court of Russia has no clear-cut policy in this regard. In such a situation, ordinary judges choose individual strategies which are indispensable as fidelity to the letter of law is inadequate for adjudicating such cases. The case of Pussy Riot and the other cases analyzed in our paper serve as examples of this tendency. The court practice in religious cases can be better explained from this perspective than in light of presumed political influence.
Introduction
This research sets out the problem of analyzing the available mechanisms for the judicial protection of religious freedoms in Russia from the standpoint of legal argumentation theory.
The technique of argumentation applied by judges is the main object of examination for the authors who first examine several administrative cases connected with the banning of 'nontraditional' religious denominations and new religious cults for reasons of national security, and with anti-extremism policies, and secondly, the criminal case of Pussy Riot. These examples show that judicial reasoning in religious cases is more policy-based than rule-based. Fidelity to the texts of statutes would be a vain undertaking for the judge considering such a case, which inevitably implies a large degree of interpretation in debates about the social admissibility of religious cults and practices. The Constitutional Court of Russia has preferred to abstain from interfering with matters pertaining to religious freedoms, so there are almost no clear-cut constitutional policies in this field. Case law of the Supreme Court of Russia is weak, which leaves adjudication on the limits of religious freedoms to the lower courts, without formulating any precedential principles. This position of the superior judicial bodies gives opportunity to the courts of general jurisdiction to choose ad hoc their strategies. In general, they tend to support state organs against non-traditional believers or new religious movements, considering this function as a part of their duty to maintain social order. Although, we do not follow the usual interpretation of this tactic as politically influenced. The influence the RF Presidential Administration can exert on the judiciary in Russia is undeniable, but this influence cannot explain the emergence of different strategies where the courts largely differ in the arguments they use, and in the judgments they deliver. The power of interpretation possessed by the judges is revealed through an analysis of the arguments employed in these cases; and in turn, these arguments reveal the hidden motives which determined the outcome of a court case, for example the religious beliefs of the judge. From this perspective, the argumentation of the ordinary courts is a fertile ground for analyzing the situation concerning the judicial protection of religious freedoms in Russia.
The criminal case of Pussy Riot is the focus of the paper. Far from considering it a show trial, the authors study the argumentation of the verdict where the court's reasoning was generally based on the balancing of the social values and the legal principles, rather than on strictly following the legislation. On this basis the court introduced a new defense for religious feelings, considering the insulting of such feelings as the corpus delicti of hooliganism. Even if incompatible with the principle of nulla poena sine lege praevia and with that of legal certainty,
Methodology
The determinant factors in the selection of the methodology for this research were influenced by the peculiarities of judicial decision making, derived from the specific features of the legal norms, system, and actors in Russia.
a) Legal norms as general rules of conduct and the need for interpretation
Generality: this specific characteristic of legal norms, does not necessitate going into detail when adjudicating concrete cases; norms only convey information about the framework patterns of behavior which shall be adopted in typical situations, and do not prescribe specific rules of conduct for the variety of factual situations, which can be similar and share common features with the typical situation described in the norm, but which are not fully identical to it.
Many comparative lawyers see in this peculiarity of legal thinking the most characteristic feature of the civil law system. 5 Thus legal norms leave room for extensive judicial interpretation which in continental legal systems plays the role analogous to that of judicial lawmaking in the courts of common law, even if the technique of detailing the similarities and differences between the judicial decisions, between their ratio decidendi, is not largely applied in the continental (civil) law. As was pointed out by Belgian legal philosopher Chaim Perelman, the continental legal system "puts the judge under the obligation both to give a judgment, under pain of denial of justice […] and to give a motivated judgment. Because of these obligations, the legal system is treated as a complete system in which every claim of the parties ought to be susceptible to being adjudged as consistent with or contrary to the law. The system may be considered complete in itself or it may become so only by the avowed intervention of the judge: in either case it is important to note that the obligation to give a judgment takes priority over fidelity to any particular rules of proof, deduction or interpretation." 6 practice. 7 It is far from easy to express such implicit social compacts in words, given the multiplicity of meanings conveyed by these conventions. On the other hand, it is the function of the judge not only to deliver judgments on the cases brought before him or her, but also to motivate these judgments, and to provide the justification (to legitimize) of the judgments made in the absence of unambiguous legal norms (the "penumbra cases" in the terminology of Hart 8 ).
In this sense, revealing and referring to deep and surface conventions is a part of the work of the judge, where he or she cannot arrive at a solution to the case before him or her pursuant only to the legal texts. This "law job" (Karl Llewellin) often remains hidden behind the formal wordings of court decisions in the civil law countries, but with the help of the argumentation theory it can become more or less apparent in the implicit propositions on which the judges base their verdicts.
b) The interpretation of the confused notions
The idea that all legal and moral norms are substantially undetermined has been developed in the work of many philosophers, among which are Georg Henrik von Wright and Chaim Perelman. This approach sets out the problem of reasoning in concrete cases in which notions that seem ordinary and well-known in general need to be interpreted in light of the particularities of an individual case. As von Wright puts it, "notions central to the moral life of man such as good and evil, virtue and vice, justice and injustice, are concepts in search of a meaning. Although familiar from daily life they are at the same time obscure and vacillating.
There may exist wide consensus about how to use them -but there is also much disagreement and controversy about their application to individual cases." 9 Such concepts, described by von Wright, were defined by Perelman as "confused notions." This definition has at least two different meanings because there are two cases in legal argumentation in which we are confronted with notions that are confused. First, we face confused notions when the interlocutors are governed by prejudice, which is a distortion and a simplification of reality that necessarily entails confusion. Secondly, we face the confused notion after discussing the matter, and this means that there are still controversies left related to the certain irreducible vagueness of the 7 terms we use. 10 This ambiguity has two causes. First, the language we use in jurisprudence is a natural one as opposed to an artificial formalized language (e.g. in mathematics, logical studies, etc.). Second, jurisprudence deals with human behavior and its motives, the values and beliefs of society that cannot be expressed in univocal terms because of their irreducible complexity and policontexuality. 11 Finally, it means impossibility of syllogistic image of law-enforcement.
According to Chaim Perelman, "if one of the meanings is regarded as the "true sense" of the word […] all the others must be either deliberate or unconscious misuses of the term".
12 Nevertheless, such notions as "freedom," "religion," "justice," have no clear meaning and can
be "made precise and applied only by selecting and bringing to the fore certain of their aspects that are incompatible with others or with notions whose use can be conceived only in terms of their vagueness: an evaluation has to be made by referring both to the subject who acts and the result obtained." 13 Every time we need to establish such a meaning in a concrete case, the agreement must be determined by the context in which the meaning is sought. "Before agreeing on the use of a term, agreement must be reached on the system of thought within which this concept should be used." 14 As argued below, one can treat the notion "religious belief" as an essentially confused notion -its irreducible complexity does not allow the legislator to fix the corresponding legal rules in an unequivocal manner and always leaves the judge scope for interpretation in cases connected with religious freedoms. Although, the dominant legal doctrine in Russia does not acknowledge that the judge may have a large discretion in any category of cases and erroneously tries to limit the judges with simple application of the laws; unsurprising, this results in a conceptual conflict between the ideology (where the judge is solely to implement the laws) and the reality (where the judge is able to give to the laws any interpretation depending on his or her personal convictions).
c) Formal constraints for legal reasoning and the ways to evade them
According to the ideology prevailing in the civil law countries after the French Revolution, a judge is bound by the statutes ("Le juge est la bouche de la loi", according to Montesquieu), but this ideology misrepresents the real state of the affairs. But "if the 19 th century 8 for law was the century of formalism, associated with the statist and legalistic conception of law and of legal rules; the 20 th century, under the influence of sociological and methodological considerations, leads to realism, legal pluralism, and to the acceptance of the increasing role of general principles of law, to a more topical understanding than the legalistic conception of legal reasoning. This results in the recognition of the role of judge in the development of law and in the preeminence of the effectiveness of the rule of law over its formal validity". 15 The most of legal scholars had to accept that the judge has no normative constraints when adjudicating the cases before them; in reality, judges can introduce or even distort the official legal rules under the guise of interpretation or filling in the gaps. "Even in the case of a judge who rests content with following the beaten tracks of jurisprudence and has no desire for innovation, his role is not entirely passive. Indeed, since every vision of reality is to some extent subjective-the more so in that it is a question of a reconstruction rather than of a direct vision-the upright judge will, even involuntarily, be led, in his evaluation of the facts, to make the law and his own inner feeling for justice coincide. By taking his stand on certain evidence or by denying its importance, by having regard to certain facts or by so interpreting them as to deprive them of all meaning, the judge is able to produce a different picture of reality and to deduce from it a different application of the rules of justice." 16 One of the most specific features of legal reasoning pointed out by Perelman is that since positive law is governed by well-defined texts, legal argumentation has to be developed within this definite system. "The lack of self-evidence attributed to certain rules, the so-called necessity for justifying them, is the consequence of immediately converting the possibility of challenging them into a search for their basis. This is because, even if the values protected by the law are not disputed, any difficulty in applying the rules threatens to set in motion a whole chain of argumentation in which the possible foundations of the rule will probably have to be considered." 20 Our choice of the case law used in this article remains mostly subjective. On the one hand, our perspective has been technically restricted by the cases and sources which were available for the authors (not all decisions of the courts of general jurisdiction are yet publicly available, nor are some cases connected with "national security" and other similar clauses). A great caseload also must be considered: according to the statistic data of the Judicial Department of the SCRF [Sudebnyi department pri Verkhovnom sude RF] for 2011 there were about 1 million of verdicts in criminal cases; more than 12 million of decisions in civil cases; more than 5 million of judgments in administrative cases -only the first instance of the general jurisdiction courts is considered (see: <http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=5>). On the other hand, unable to analyze all this bulk of case-law, we have chosen several "pivotal" cases which drew widespread public attention. Here we also commit that the choice was subjective, and putatively it could not have been otherwise. Our investigation in this paper does not pretend to describe all the case law on religious matters in Russia. On the basis of the materials available to us, we formulate some theoretical insights about what is going on with the religious freedoms in Russian courts. The only claim to objectivity we may maintain is that our position was not (as we hope) influenced by our religious credo. appealing to a "universal audience" which conceptually serves as a model for sound argumentation. The idea of a universal audience does not refer "to an experimentally proven fact, but to a universality and unanimity imagined by the speaker, to the agreement of an audience which should be universal, since, for legitimate reasons, we need not take into consideration those who are not part of it." 30 The speaker constructs a universal audience to entreat the concrete audience before them -which "can never amount to more than floating incarnations of this universal audience". 31 In other words, it is a conceptual model which can be reconstructed on the basis of the arguments employed in court debates and fixed in the legal documents of a case, and which allows the determination of what were the basic implicit conventions and value judgments around which the debates in the courtroom turned.
Our hypothesis is that criminal and administrative court practice (in Russia which is the field of our analysis here) is in a major part defined by the current representations in the judicial community of the factual and ideological constraints, including the argumentation techniques, political and societal balances, the goals of judicial activity, and the hierarchical order of different rules and principles. It does not mean that the legal texts do not play any role in the adjudication of cases before the court -we are far from contending, as Charles Evans Hughes does, that "the law is what the judges say it is". Doubtlessly, these texts do play a role in fixing what the corpus delicti is and in setting out a general framework for the legal argumentation to establish the connection between this and the factual state of affairs, but the court's judgment on the relative weight of the arguments, the persuasive force of the evidence, the severity of the punishment and many other factors in each concrete case cannot rest on the textual wording of the statutes. These external factors largely prefigure the outcome of the proceedings and the final verdict of the court; they can be revealed through reconstructing the conceptual modelPerelman's 'audience' -to which the arguments were addressed. In this sense, Oliver W.
Holmes Jr. was right when claiming that "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience". Perelman explains that "[w]hen the jurist defends a logical interpretation of law, when his opponents retort that "the life of law is not logic, but experience," when advocates accuse each other of not respecting logic, the word "logic" does not designate in any of these cases formal logic, the only one practiced by the majority of professional logicians, but juridical logic, which modern logicians entirely ignore. logic initially stressed by Perelman appears to be inherent in any type of reasoning about values not only inside the courtroom, but also in ethics, politics, and philosophy.
In this light the study of court decisions can also provide important data about the mindsets of the judicial community -such as they have been shaped by the previous judgments and such as they will probably be outlined in future decisions. Reconstructing the "universal audience" can thus become a viable method to look inside the process of policy-making. The verdicts delivered in criminal cases are more symptomatic of the growing role of policy-making in Russian courtrooms. In criminal cases the maxim "nulla crimen, nulla poena sine lege praevia" formally prevents the judges from attempts to broadly construct the legislative provisions. In all the other categories of cases the judge can almost always claim that there is a gap in the law to be filled on the base of policies. It has been discussed by many legal theorists, illustrate some of our suggestions, we will take several cases from Russia examined by the ECtHR.
To carry out this task, we will start with a succinct analysis of the historical background of the religious question in Russia. Also we will consider the relevant provisions of Russian law which regulate religious freedoms. We may assert that these laws do not contain such provisions which stand in a flagrant contradiction to the laws of other countries of Europe. 33 Nevertheless, it has been repeatedly stated by many researchers that the real constraints imposed on the believers 33 To our knowledge, there is no literature which insists on there being such contradictions between the Russian and Western laws on religious freedoms (surely, apart from the issue of their implementation).
14 from "non-traditional" religious denominations are harsher in Russia (and ex-USSR countries) than in other European countries. 34 This difference between the "law in books" and the "law in action" can be explained by, among other reasons, the different cultural environment and historical traditions which gave rise to the particular social philosophy formulated by the Slavophiles. 35 The political constraints, including the rhetoric of sovereignty, and the activity of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in the political and legal discourse 36 can also be listed among the important factors influencing the reasoning of the Russian judiciary. Therefore, a comparative analysis of legal texts cannot explain the dissimilar conclusions the judges draw in matters concerning the protection or restriction of religious freedoms in different countries. 37 As such, tradition, the political situation, or confessional principles cannot serve as rationales for the differences in legal regulation, although they surely can influence the formation of the legal mentality in different social communities. The impact of these and other factors result in the setting out of a particular set of values, referring to which the Russian law-enforcement agencies justify the stricter control of religious life. reasoned to grant protection to church rules and how she integrated these rules into the "social order" to be maintained and protected by the state courts.
To follow the ideas of Michel Troper, "when the State imposes a religious rule, it does so by means of its own law and thus immediately translates the religious rule into a secular one that will be interpreted and applied as such". 42 So it was with the judgment in the Pussy Riot case, where the judge delivered the decision thoroughly elaborating the linkage between the infraction of religious rules and the sanction of state law -such a linkage can be considered an individual norm in terms of Hans Kelsen's theory. Even if it could be formally deemed wrong, 43 this verdict can be justified from the perspective of a broader understanding of the role of the court as an institution whose function is to be "the architect of social engineering".
44
The conflict between promoting traditional religious denominations and not infringing upon the rights and interests of other confessions can also be seen in other cases brought before the Russian courts, especially the administrative ones (mostly connected with disbanding of religious denominations). Below, several cases will be cited where the courts interpreted the formal provisions of the actual legislation not in the literal sense, but with a view to the policies behind these statutes. The argumentation employed in these cases is symptomatic of the principles underpinning the legal regulation of religious freedoms in Russia. It is also important that no clear principles were formulated by the Constitutional Court of Russia (CCRF). The only 40 The abbreviation used in this paper for Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation. 41 Now the fine is from 30000 to 50000 RUR (from about 700 to 1200 EUR). 42 Michel Troper, "Sovereignty and Laicite", 30 Cardozo Law Review (2008-2009), 2561. 43 We are critical of the political background found by many Western observers behind this case: "The politicians said and the courts did", as the reality is much more complex: judges in Russia as elsewhere are responsive to the political consequences of their decisions, but it is by far not the only constraint on Russian judges. 44 As Roscoe Pound puts it "or the purpose of understanding the law of today I am content with a picture of satisfying as much of the whole body of human wants as we may with the least sacrifice. I am content to think of law as a social institution to satisfy social wants -the claims and demands involved in the existence of civilized society -by giving effect to as much as we may with the least sacrifice, so far as such wants may be satisfied or such claims given effect by an ordering of human conduct through politically organized society. For present purposes I am content to see in legal history the record of a continually wider recognizing and satisfying of human wants or claims or desires through social control; a more embracing and more effective securing of social interests; a continually more complete and effective elimination of waste and precluding of friction in human enjoyment of the goods of existence -in short, a continually more efficacious social engineering" (Roscoe Pound, An Introduction To The Philosophy Of Law (Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1999), 20).
case of intervention of the CCRF into the religious matters concerned a question which was rather formal: the ruling of 23.11.1999 No.16-P on the re-registration of religious denominations.
This ruling did not contain any substantial argumentation about legal principles and policies in the religious domain applying instead the general principles of law, and left room for the ordinary courts to introduce policies. The abstention of the CCRF from interfering in religious matters, even in cases which were later accepted and resolved by the ECtHR, led to a lack of legal certainty in these matters, which is attested by the Pussy Riot case and others. As asserted above, the law texts are incapable of giving definite guidance either for judges or ordinary citizens, 45 so it is not surprising that the missing principles and policies were ad hoc elaborated in different judicial instances. Under these circumstances, it cannot be expected that these principles are completely coherent, so we still have an unpredictability, even if the formal legal texts on the matter in their literal meaning mostly have univocal significance. 
The Secular State in the Russian history and in Russian law
The freedom of personal choice in religious matters was not recognized before 1917, and expressions of religious beliefs contradicting the official religion were not legally permitted. This trend did not change in Soviet Russia, where Communism became the Weltanschauung and played a role similar to that of religion. 47 It is not surprising that the amalgamation of the state and the church/party, of legal, (quasi-)religious, corporative, and moral norms prevailed both in Imperial and Soviet Russia. Here we do not explain the present situation with religious freedoms in Russia entirely by referring to the historical heritage of the country, but a few words about this heritage can be helpful to demonstrate the intricacies which shaped the particular attitude of the Russians toward the legal regulation of the religious matters. 48 If contemporary Western legal culture was formed mainly in the course of the struggle for freedom of consciousness, and the first ideas of human rights in England, France, and the issue of religious freedoms did not play any substantial role in discussions about human rights in the prerevolutionary Russia at the beginning of the 20 th century, or in the era of perestroika at the end of that century. It cannot be said that this issue was irrelevant to the public or was not discussed at all -the question about the choice of religion and confession was debated by Vladimir Solovyov and many other Russian philosophers of the Silver Age, 50 but the discussion of this question publically was barred by the official legislation of Imperial Russia, where the Orthodoxy was established as the official state religion and the Emperor was the head of the Church. For example, Vladimir Solovyov could only publish his reflections on the possible union of the Christian Churches abroad, and in French. 51 Discussions on religious matters at that time were considered challenge to the official ideology, so that free public deliberations on these matters were not possible in Imperial Russia.
After the revolution, religion was proclaimed to be "the opium of the people" 52 and was progressively banned from public life. conviction that "true religious pluralism is an inherent feature of the notion of a democratic society". This connotation, along with a certain nostalgia for pre-Bolshevik Russia can partly explain why this principle is not perceived in Russian society by clerics and many lay intellectuals as indisputable -unlike such other fundamental principles as democracy, the rule of law, the integrity of the country and other policies set out in the Constitution.
55
The encroachment on religious freedoms seems to Western observers as an indisputable and impermissible violation of human rights, however this is not so for many Russians. Along with a lack of public discussion on the connection between human rights and religious freedom, it is important to remember that during the Soviet rule the Christianity (not only and not so much of Russia", and also for "damaging or destroying such objects and places." The punishment proposed by the authors for such crimes varied from fines (from 100 000 to 500 000 rubles) to imprisonment (up to 3 years, in the previous draft up to 5 years). Also the administrative liability became much more severe (the fine raised from 1000 to 50000 rubles). Many arguments were forwarded while this bill was being debated in the Russian parliament. There were conflicting opinions from the official organs, the judiciary, experts and lawyers, which reiterated the 58 Here one can mention the polemic between the SCRF and the CCRF on the possibility for ordinary courts not to apply the laws which are unconstitutional. In its Rulings "On Some Questions arising in the application of the Constitution in the administration of justice" (No. 8 of 31 October, 1995) and "On the Judicial Decision" (No. 23 of 19 December, 2003) the SCRF insisted that when the court finds a discrepancy between a law and the Constitution, it shall directly apply the Constitution. The CCRF in its Ruling No 19-P of 16 June, 1998 challenged this position and opined that only the CCRF is competent to decide whether there are any discrepancies between laws and the Constitution, so that an ordinary court has either to apply the law, or to bring a petition to the CCRF for the examination of the alleged unconstitutionality of the law. Therefore, facing the discrepancy between the Constitution and Law No. 125-FZ the ordinary courts will have to apply the Law and avoid assessing its merits in the light of the case-law of the ECtHR. The conceptual and terminological background of this law is disputable. First, the very idea of punishing people for insulting the feelings of other people is strange from the standpoint of commonly accepted criteria dividing law and morality (respectively, regulating the external behavior and the inner spirituality). Further, if such notions as "public insult", "desecration" are familiar to Russian decision-makers and have an established significance in the judicial community, the notion of "humiliation" used in a combination with "worship," "rite," and "ceremony" is very uncertain in the light of their probable interpretation by the courts. The SCRF in its official opinion mentioned these and other concerns about "the unusual terms for the vocabulary used in the criminal law doctrine" and about possible intersections of this corpus delicti with others from Penal code. 59 Similar criticisms were forwarded by the Social Chamber and by the Government. As a result, the draft bill was rewritten and resubmitted with some minor terminological changes, but the idea of the new corpus delicti "insulting the feelings" remained intact.
The most controversial provision of this newly adopted law now refers to the liability for actions directed against the worship, rites, ceremonies, objects and places of the religions that form an integral part of the historical heritage of the peoples of Russia. Russian legislation contains no criteria for distinguishing between religions which "form" and "do not form" this with the law and the equal responsibility for the violation of the law, but also the equal right for protection from the unlawful acts.
Court practice: policies against rules?
The legal argumentation of general jurisdiction courts can still be characterized as mostly rule-based. The courts usually confine themselves to a formal analysis of legal norms applicable to a case: if the norms approve or disapprove certain typical behavior, and if the human acts examined in a specific case are a part of this logical set, the court would be highly reluctant to go into the details of the situation, to ponder what are particularities of the case and whether the general norm shall be applied to the case from the point of view of reasonability, justice, and the like non-formal criteria. 60 Several cases considered in the ECtHR contrast the rule-based approach of the Russian courts and the court devotes substantial analysis to these cases. the Article 14, interpreting these defenses so broadly that justification can be found for closing down any religious denomination. qualification of symbols as Nazi's because the main criterion for determining the symbols and attributes as prohibited is the similarity with those of Nazi's." This argumentation exemplifies the fact that if there are the symbols, signs and the associative links between them and some political ideologies which are firmly established in the social mentality, then these symbols acquire a particular significance independent both of their perception by the adherent and their historical and conceptual sources. In terms of our analysis, we can observe how the judge constructs the "universal audience" which is expressly referred to in this court decision -it is the perception of the concerned symbol by this imaginary audience and not the historical provenance of this symbol or the perception of this symbol by the believers which proved to be decisive in the argumentation of the court.
Many similar cases can be cited 71 which demonstrate that the legislative provisions can be interpreted broadly, also covering situations which were not initially conceived of by the legislature, as in the two cases described above, with the disbanding of religious denominations.
In these cases the formal statutory norms were overruled by policies which allowed to the court to close down "socially dangerous sects". We would rather avoid qualifying such policies as illegitimate or threatening legal certainty, although one can argue that such extensive argumentation is rather unusual for the Russian judiciary where the traditions of legal formalism prevail. Legal formalism promises simplicity, which can be obtained through the coherent application of the precise and univocal rules and concepts and through fidelity of the judiciary to the deductive decision-making procedure. 72 In cases concerning control over the religious sphere the reliance on formalism is not very convenient because it does not facilitate the courts' reasoning in assessing the impact of the disputed symbols, practices, and activities on the social environment, which is the main topic discussed in the processes connected with disbanding religious denominations. Formalism permits the courts to abstain from going deep into doctrinal religious statements and inter-confessional debates, but this tactic is not productive when reconsidered by other courts which adjudicate the cases connected with that slogan. 75 As one can infer from these cases, the clause of extremism can be used by the authorities 
The sociological argumentation from the Pussy Riot case
The accusation of hooliganism brought under article 213 of Penal Code of Russia against order and expressed an open disrespect for society, this disrespect being based on religious hatred and enmity against a certain social group -which is corpus delicti of article 213. Below we will analyze how the court came to the conclusion that an antireligious action conducted inside church walls could be identified with a serious infraction of the order of society as a whole and with disrespect for this entire society, and not only for the community of Orthodox believers.
The argumentation of the court refers to several ideas about social control, which should be provided by the state and its courts, and construes society as the addressee of the blasphemy.
This allowed the court to infer that the action was not a political one, but that it endangered the entire society. This question was one of the most material ones for the case, as if it were only insulting for believers and not for the entire society, the action had to be qualified as a misdemeanor under part 2 of article 5.26 of Administrative code with the maximum fine of 1000 rubles. Putatively, this blasphemy was conceived of and conducted with regard to its possible legal qualification as a minor misdemeanor as the materials of the criminal dossier show that the action was not spontaneous, and was carefully planned and prepared. But in its reasoning the court ruled out the application of this administrative fine, finding that the action brought about a serious threat to society, and required a stronger punishment. Here the principles of legal certainty, on the one hand, and the interests of social integrity, on the other, were at stake, the court weighing them and choosing the second.
In our analysis we do not wish to evaluate the verdict, state whether from a legal point of view the charges were brought correctly or not, whether the evidence was persuasive enough for a conviction, or what were the real intentions of the accused and the social impact of their action.
Our analysis is confined to the arguments with which the court linked the requirement to observe church rules with the requirement that the entire social order shall not be impinged on. We will refer to the pages of the verdict of 17 August, 2012 in the case No. 1-170/12 of church… with the intention to garb themselves inappropriately in order to demonstrate their disrespect toward the Christian world and to the church canons". Planning their action and being willing to make it known "not only to the visitors and the church staff, but also to other citizens who were not present in the church", the accused blogged about the planned action, inviting others to join them. Here the court links the church rites and rules which were the immediate target of the crime, with the social impact which was intended by the action in question. In this reasoning the court implicitly presumes that the inner orders of the church and their possible violation, if known to the public, can exert an influence on the entire society, and found in the plans of the accused exactly this malice intent.
This intent was carried out, the accused entered the ambo and performed there their profanities, which resulted in "the violation of public tranquility and order, in disturbance of the normal functioning of the Church, as it is established in the internal regulation of the Church, in the demonstration of disrespect toward those who were inside the Church, in the insulting the feelings of those of them who are religious" (page 3). The next sentence is of particular interest, as here the court qualifies the blasphemy as infringement of the principles of the social order to connect it with the corpus delicti of hooliganism: "In general, the action in question was carried out in an evidently impious and irreverent form which was devoid of any morals or ethical standards, and which uttered religious hatred and enmity to one of the existing religionsChristianity, impinging on the equality, identity, and the vital importance of this religion for a large number of nations and peoples" (page 3). In this argumentation the court bridges the connection between the first premise (the fact of insulting the feelings of the believers) and the expected conclusion (that the action contravenes the ethical standards and endangers the social order), in the meantime introducing the presumption that Christianity is vital for many nations and peoples. With these precepts at hand, the court infers that the blasphemy uttered in the given circumstances was dangerous for some peoples and nations (not concretized in the verdict, putatively the Russian nation is implicated inter alia), and thereof it concludes that the action encroaches on the vital basis of the society which is built up by these peoples and nations.
On the following pages the court described witness testimonies and the protocols where the evidence was fixed, the expert's report and other proofs, abstaining from any evaluation of these testimonies and evidence (pages 4-28). The evaluation begins from page 29 where the court rejects some evidence collected in the pretrial process arguing that these opinions were based on the previous qualification of this action under article 282 of Penal Code (the excitement of hatred or enmity, the humiliation of human dignity). As this qualification had been abandoned by the prosecution, and the criminal charges were changed for hooliganism under article 213, the 33 court dismissed the applicability of the expert opinions where the blasphemy action was discussed and examined with reference to the corpus delicti of article 282 (page 29).
Rejecting the objections of the defense based on the inadmissibility of referring to any canon laws or regulations, and bringing in a state court an accusation based on these canon laws, the court agreed that church law is established only on the grounds of ecclesiastical texts.
However, their ecclesiastical character does not mean that they cannot be protected by the state which is proclaimed to be secular. In the court's opinion, as the freedom of worship is guaranteed by the Constitution, the infraction of the ecclesiastical rules can be classified as an infraction of the social order, which includes the worship and ritual rites indirectly protected by the constitutional norms (pages 31-32). This argumentation is founded on the assumption that there is no need for the state to introduce official legal norms for behavior inside churches, as such conduct can be regulated by the church rules; such internal regulation does not contradict the Constitution and does not bar church rules of conduct from the protection of the State. Such reasoning constitutes an additional linkage between the violation of church rules, the obligation of the state to protect these rules, and finding the Pussy Riot action to be an act of hooliganism.
This linkage allowed the court to proceed to the central issue of these criminal chargeswhether there was an infraction of the moral rules or the religious ones, and whether the blasphemy in question did not go beyond insulting the feelings of the believers and in this sense should be qualified as a misdemeanor under part 2 of article 5.26 of the Administrative Code.
The court reasoned that it could accept the arguments of the defense if the action was conducted outside of the religious site (page 33), but given that the action occurred inside, it "changes the very object of the crime, as this action involves the complex of the relationships between human beings; the rules of conduct set forward in the normative regulations, in the morality, and in the traditions which secure the social tranquility and protection of the people in various spheres of activities; the normal functioning of the state and social institutions" (page 33). In the following argumentation the court held that "the places and the buildings which stand in the centre of social attention (such as churches, cathedrals, temples.) and where worship and other religious rites occur, are public places" (page 38). Here the reasoning relies on the previous findings according to which the disrespect of church rules can be identified as disregard for the order of the entire society (page 2), because of the vital role of Christianity (page 3) and the legal protection granted by the Constitution to religious communities, their ceremonies and rites (page 32).
This reasoning led the court to the conclusion that "uttering cuss words publicly and in the vicinity of Orthodox icons and sanctuaries, given the place of this action, cannot be 34 considered other than as an infraction of the social order, […] insofar as the people inside the Church were scoffed and laughed at, the social tranquillity was broken" (page 35). The court pursued that this action was targeted "not only at the staff and visitors of the Church, but also at other people who were not present in the Church at the moment, and who share the Orthodox traditions and customs" (page 36). The justification of the verdict is thus achieved through constructing a "universal audience" composed of all those who respect religious culture, and it is this "audience" which constituted the community whose traditions and customs were associated by the court with the rules of the social order. In this regard, the Council of the Russian Muftis officially supported the charges (pages 27-28).
Rebuffing the arguments of the defence that Russia is a secular state and shall not favour a religious confession to the detriment of the freedom of expression, the court stressed that this freedom is outweighed in this case by the rights and freedoms of the believers (article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights was not directly mentioned but the court evidently took into consideration the balances set out in this article). The court reasoned that the accused "opposed the adherents of Orthodox Christian values, and thereby in a demonstrative and pretentious manner expressed their disrespect for church traditions and dogmas which have been protected and revered from centuries past, exhibited themselves in a way which humiliates the inner convictions of the people spiritually linked to God" (page 36). It was especially noted in the verdict that during the blasphemy no mention was made about any politicians, nor any political claims were uttered (page 38), so that for the "audience" the action was religious and not political. 80 We do not enter into discussion about so called "copy-paste" technique when the judge in criminal cases inserts parts of accusation act into his or her verdict, and to which extent the argumentation in the Pussy Riot belongs to the judge or to the prosecution officers. Given the position of the judge as of an impartial observer in the process who cannot refer in his or her to any other arguments except those advocated by the parties, referring to the arguments of the prosecution in verdicts where the accused is held guilty does not constitute a violation of procedural rules. As the author of the verdict is the judge, it is quite explicable that we refer to verdict's argumentation as belonging to the judge.
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interests which are not sufficiently defended by the statutes. In the present case the derisory fine provided by the Administrative Code for insulting religious beliefs was considered by the court as disproportional given the social danger of the blasphemy in question, so that the court in this trial circuitously designed a new argument to protect "the social order".
Conclusion
Systematic studies of legal phenomena demonstrate that law has never existed separately from other systems of regulation of the relationships within the society, such as religion, and
morals. An appeal to the history of law shows that in the earliest periods of the development of human society legal norms did not exist as independent and autonomous. Moreover, the authorities that controlled the observance of the norms in earlier times were mostly religious.
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Later these functions were handed over to executive powers and only then did a secular authority appear. This process was described by Max Weber. However, secularity is not an absolute variable in society; it is subject to gradations so that religion is never completely separated from the state. The extent of this is set forth in the statutes, but their wording cannot be the only source 
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experience of the people. They also depend on the personal choice of the judges who introduce the policies through their judgments.
Our analysis reveals some of the characteristics of how judges in Russia handle religious freedoms, which are alternative approaches to regulation. When adjudicating a case, the judge is free to deliver any decision and to support it with any argumentation whatsoever, but within the limits of the constraints existing in their professional community. These limits are in fact set forth not so much by the legislation, but rather by the doctrine, the instructions, and the case-law of the higher courts. Such limits might be well established, as in the system of Russian commercial courts, or might be vague, and sometimes contradictory, as in courts of general were subject to disbanding and the "extremist books" were banned. The argumentation in these cases does not formalistically rest on the wording of the legal rules, but goes into details of the religious cults. The findings of the court can be grouped around such principles to justify the broad interpretation of the applicable legal rules. A special case is the verdict delivered in the case of Pussy Riot, where the court introduced a new defense for religious feelings. This defense was missing in Penal Code prior to the verdict. While the hearings in the court were in progress, a draft bill with new corpus delicti to legislate against insulting religious feelings was introduced; after the hearings had been over, this draft bill was adopted establishing the criminal liability which de facto had been already created by the court in Pussy Riot case. This draft bill and its development are briefly examined in the paper.
We are aware that the cases examined do not represent all the variety of the nuances which arise in Russian courts in religious cases. The focus of our study was the issue of the heuristic value of case-based analysis of legal argumentation which allows for a broader explicative scheme than that of the presumed political influence behind the court decisions. Such 37 analysis can be useful for studies conducted in the domain of the human rights, and especially in the sphere of the protection of the religious freedoms where cases, in fact, are considered on the base of supralegal criteria.
